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Abstract

In this study we examine the relation between ownership structure and corporate
performance; the sample of the study included 42 out of 48 companies of all sectors in
Bahrain Bourse in five years from 2007-2011. Several dimensions of ownership
concentration were studied in addition to managerial and institutional ownership. Two
different measurements of performance were used (ROA and Tobin’s Q). The study
investigated this relation using several control variables and 2SLS statistical method to
overcome the problem of endogeneity that may exist between the study variables. It was
found that ownership concentration have a negative effect with statistical significance on
company performance. Institutional ownership was found to have a positive effect on
company performance. Managerial ownership was not found to have a significant effect
on company performance, however it was found that managerial ownership has a positive
effect on performance only in the case of declining ownership concentration. Other
results were revealed by the study regarding company age, size, growth, board size and
liquidity. The study is considered to have theoretical and practical implications. It
contributes to the debate about agency theory and managerial entrenchment. It also may
help officials in Bahrain in making laws and legislations concerning corporate
governance improvement in Bahraini market.
JEL Classification: M40, G34
Keywords: Ownership structure; Ownership concentration; Foreign ownership;
Institutional ownership; Managerial ownership; Company performance, endogeneity,
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Introduction
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied
intensively by many researchers interested in corporate finance. This area of research is
receiving a growing amount of interest due to the mixed results that have been obtained.
Most studies were conducted in the Anglo Saxon market environment, however, those
results cannot be generalized to other market environments due to the differences found
in each one of them. Ownership structure is receiving much attention due to its
correlation with agency theory and corporate governance. The mixed results may be
justified because of the different dimensions found in ownership. The most important
dimensions that will be focused on are ownership concentration and managerial
ownership. This relation was discussed early (in 1932) when Berle and Means discussed
the role of management and majority versus minority shareholders in the performance of
a company. Traditional agency theory emphasises the potential conflict between
unmonitored management and widely dispersed shareholders. The vast majority of
studies conducted in USA focused on this conflict. However, in other market
environments, like the European market and some emerging economies, ownership is
much more concentrated which creates majority and minority shareholders creating a
potential conflict that may affect the company performance, especially in the absence of
laws and legislation that protect minority shareholders.
Recently the debate moved from the USA to other markets around the world to identify
how ownership structure affects firm performance under the different market
circumstances found outside the Anglo-Saxon markets. This study is concerned with
exploring that relation in an emerging small market in the GCC, which is the Bahraini
market. Few studies have been undertaken on that issue in the GCC and in the Bahraini
market in particular. This study aims to cover this gap by providing evidence from
Bahrain that contributes to the current ongoing debate on the relation between ownership
and firm performance. This study gains in importance in view of the intensive efforts by
the Bahrain Monetary Agency to promote Bahrain as an international financial centre
(Hussain & Mallin, 2003). So, it is crucial to take a closer look at the Bahraini market
that will benefit researchers, investors and law makers to improve the Bahraini market in
serving the vision of the Bahraini Monetary Agency.
Related Literature and Hypothesis
The core of this study lies in agency theory and managerial entrenchment argumentation.
It provides new empirical evidence in the ongoing research on ownership structure
attempting to uncover the diverging interests of different kinds of shareholders and how
this may affect company performance. Agency theory suggests that concentrated
ownership will result in better monitoring of the management which makes ownership an
important element in corporate governance. This, in turn
improves company
performance. Some studies such as Demesetz and Lehn, 1985; Demesetz and Vilalonga,
2001; Kumar, 2003; Rowe and Davidson, 2002 found that there is no significant
relationship between concentrated ownership and company value. Other studies such as
Pivovarsky, 2003; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, 2005; Joh, 2002; Xu and Wang, 1997
found a significant relationship between the two variables. Some studies found a positive
but insignificant relationship between the two variables (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).
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Traditional agency theory claims that more concentrated ownership would enhance the
ability of shareholders to monitor management of the company, preventing it from taking
self-serving decisions affecting the performance of the company negatively. This claim
may be true in market environments where laws and legislation protecting minority
shareholders are strong like the USA. Concentrated ownership creates majority
shareholders and minority shareholders with diverging interests and objectives. In a
market environment where laws protecting minority shareholders are absent or weak, a
situation of majority shareholders controlling the company will be created and the
performance of the company would be affected negatively. Theoretically, it may be said
that an increase in ownership concentration should lead to a reduction in the costs of
separation of ownership and control benefiting company performance eventually.
However, the larger shareholders may benefit from that improvement privately at the
expense of smaller shareholders. This study aims at investigating the effect of
concentrated ownership on performance in the Bahraini market which is considered to be
an emerging market and it is not mature in regard to the laws protecting minority
shareholders. The study claims that concentrated ownership in a weak law market
environment affects performance negatively.
The first hypothesis of the study may be:
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and
company performance.
Many studies were interested in finding out the effects of ownership on performance but
the results varied widely. In a study of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), they
investigated the effect of insider ownership on company value in the US market and
found a non-monotonic relationship between the two variables. This evidence was
explained through “incentive and entrenchment integrated theory”. Researchers also
found conflicting results regarding managerial ownership as some found a positive
relationship (Severin, 2001; Kumar, 2003). Others did not find that relationship (Demsetz
& Villalonga, 1999; Rowe & Davidson, 2002; Long & So, 2002).
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and company
performance.
When managerial ownership exceeds a certain limit, management becomes more
entrenched. This would lead the management to work on its own private interests at the
expense of small shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that the combination of
ownership and control may allow concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for
private rents. Researchers have studied widely the effect of ownership concentration,
which determines the percentage of cash flow rights, and the identity of the main owner
of the company, to determine the effect of that on company performance. According to
many studies in the field of ownership structure, family business is believed to be the
most common type of ownership that exists in the world. Some studies believes that
family owned companied suffer from severe governance problems (Perrini et al., 2008)
as their main goal is to maintain the chief executive position in the family and to invest in
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low risk projects to ensure the long lasting survival of their business. On the opposite
direction, other studies believe that there is a positive correlation between family control
and company performance because it mitigates the problem of free riding by management
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Although this debate exists in accordance with family
ownership and control, few studies put other types of concentrated ownership structures
such as institutional and managerial ownership under the microscope to investigate its
relation to company performance. Studies that were conducted in the US market could
not find a significant relation between several types of ownership and performance. Other
studies also found little impact on performance (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness,
2003). Most studies neglected the dimensionality of ownership, thus previous findings of
no relation between ownership and performance may be justified. Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001) found evidence that ownership structures do not affect performance
and explained that any maximized returns come from the interplay of market forces.
However, Welch (2003) investigated the multi dimensionality of ownership structure and
found that institutional ownership and managerial ownership are part of an endogenous
system that should be considered when performing other studies concerning the effect of
ownership on performance. Their results suggested that higher proportions of institutional
ownership resulted in better company performance, measured by T’Q (Tobin’s Q).
Berger, 2003 and Sarac, 2002 found a positive relationship with a moderate statistic
effect between institutional ownership and firm value. Others, like Wan (1990), found a
positive, statistical and significant correlation between the two variables.
H3: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and company
performance.
In a different kind of markets (the Greek market), Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007)
found that more concentrated ownership results in better performance. Perrini et al., 2008
also found that managerial ownership does not represent a mechanism of reducing agency
costs in concentrated companies in a study that was conducted in the Italian market. In
this study we will focus on the Bahraini market to anticipate the effect of ownership
concentration and managerial ownership taking into consideration the different nature of
this emerging market. The Bahraini market is one of the small markets in the Gulf region.
It is considered to be a market with a concentrated ownership (Khamis et al., 2015;
Hamdan & Sartawi, 2013). Bahrain has a 30 years vision of becoming an international
financial center, thus it is focusing more on upgrading its financial market to having the
best governance practices and a good investment environment. Khamis, et al., (2015)
which was conducted in the Bahraini market found that institutional ownership is the
most common type of ownership in Bahrain and institutional ownership had a positive
effect on company performance.
In Turkey, Sarac, (2002) conducted a study on a sample of 138 Turkish manufacturing
companies. The results showed a relation between ownership structure and net profit. It
also proved that there is a positive relation between institutional ownership and
profitability.
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A study by Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert, (2011) was conducted on a sample of 73 companies
listed on the Nigerian Stock exchange. It investigated the relation between ownership
structure and performance. It concluded that there is a negative relation between
ownership concentration and performance. There was also a negative relationship
between insider ownership and performance. The last finding was that there is a positive
but insignificant relation between foreign ownership and performance. Kumar, (2003)
investigated the relation between ownership structure and performance using ROA
measurement on a sample of 5,224 Indian companies from 1994 to 2000. He found
evidence that institutional ownership and managerial ownership are related to
performance. Nadia (2004) explored the impact of ownership structure on 15 private
banks listed in Amman Stock exchange. The study found that there is a high
concentration of ownership in Jordanian banks although this did not affect performance
which was measured using the accounting measurement Returns On Assets (ROA).
Another study which was conducted in Jordan was by Jaafar and El-Shawa, (2009) on a
sample of 132 Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock exchange from 2002 to
2005. The study examined the influence of ownership concentration and board
characteristics on performance. The study found that ownership concentration, board size
and multiple directorships has a significant and positive relationship with performance.
Bjuggren, Eklund and Wiberg (2007) explored the relationship between ownership
structure and performance in Swedish companies from 1997 to 2002. The study found
that using dual class shares, which give different voting rights and dividends to public
shareholders and founders of the company, has a negative effect on company’s
performance. Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta (2008) used a sample of companies in the Italian
market from 2000 to 2003 to explore the relation between ownership structure and
performance. It concluded that ownership concentration of the five biggest shareholders
of the company has a positive influence on firm valuation while management ownership
benefited only less concentrated ownership companies. A study conducted by Sulong and
Nor, (2008) on Malaysian listed firms, investigated the effect of dividends, ownership
structure and board governance on firm value. It found that concentrated ownership and
managerial ownership have insignificant effect on firm value which was unexpected.
Data and Methodology:
This part includes two sections. Firstly, a discussion of the study sample and sources of
data. Secondly, a section discussing the measurement of variables and variable
descriptions.
Sample and Resources of Data:
The Bahrain Bourse contains (48) listed companies. Companies were selected according
to the following criteria: data is available in the period of (5) years (2007 to 2011).
Companies have not been closed or merged with any other company during the study
period. We start the sample collection process with all the listed firms on the Bahrain
Bourse for the period of (2007-2011). We obtain data on financial statements, board
composition, and ownership structure from Bahrain Bourse Database. Six companies
were excluded from the sample and they were either non Bahraini or were closed during
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the study period, which left us with 42 companies representing 87.5% of the original
sample.
Measuring of Variables and Variable Descriptions:
The selection of variables is based on an examination of previous empirical studies, table
1 shows the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the control variables
employed for all estimated models of the study.
Regarding ownership concentration: We notice from table no. 1 that the percentage of
ownership for the first stockholder in Bahraini companies exceeds 33% and in some
companies, the percentage exceeds 85% of shares, which may be considered a high
concentration of ownership. The mean values of ownership percentages for the second
stock holder was less than that, in average it was 14% and it reaches 32% maximum. The
same may be said about the other indicators of ownership concentration as ownership
percentage declined for other levels of ownership. In general, the top five stock holders in
the Bahrain Bourse companies own more than 55% of stocks which indicated high levels
of ownership concentration.
Another indicator of ownership concentration was used which is Concentrated ownership
dummy. Company is given (1) if the first stockholder owns more than 50% of stocks. It
was noticed in table 1 that the mean for this variable is 0.231 which indicates that first
stock holder owning more than 50% in Bahrain Bourse is not common. Multiple
blockholders dummy variable gave the company (1) if there was more than two
stockholders owning more than 10% of the stocks and it was a common thing in Bahrain
Bourse as the mean of this variable was 0.667. Financial ownership dummy variable was
inserted in the study to identify the role of financial institutions ownership in improving
firm performance. It was measured by giving (1) for companies that one of its investors is
a financial institution. The mean for this variable was 0.718 which indicates a high
financial institutions ownership in Bahraini companies.
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Table 1: The measurement of variables and descriptive statistics:
Variable
Ownership Concentration:
Ownership first shareholder (%)
Ownership second shareholder
(%)
Ownership third shareholder (%)
Ownership fourth shareholder (%)
Ownership fifth shareholder (%)
Ownership 5sh (%)
Managerial ownership (%)
Concentrated ownership dummy
Multiple blockholders dummy
Financial ownership dummy
Corporate performance:
Return on Assets
Simple Tobin's Q
Control variables:
Foreign ownership
Institutional ownership
Firm size (Millions)
Financial leverage

Description

Mean

Descriptive statistics
SD
Minimum

Maximum

33.688

19.017

0.000

85.470

14.045

7.687

0.000

32.150

6.586
2.916
0.923

6.300
4.219
2.260

0.000
0.000
0.000

21.330
13.340
8.550

55.321

26.165

10.453

94.510

5.227

11.609

0.000

47.140

0.231

0.422

0.000

1.000

0.667

0.473

0.000

1.000

0.718

0.451

0.000

1.000

The ratio of the net income to the total assets.
Is the (Market value of equity + Book value of short term
liabilities)÷Book value of total assets.

3.782

9.749

-45.400

24.340

1.024

0.374

0.201

2.336

Fraction of shares owned by the foreign investors.
Fraction of shares owned by the Institutional investors.
Logarithm of the company’s total assets.
Total debt divided by total assets.

28.298
49.358
981
41.734

27.340
28.249
2,282
29.723

0.000
0.000
5
0.000

94.510
94.766
12,344
93.413

Fraction of shares owned by the first largest shareholder.
Fraction of shares owned by the second largest shareholder.
Fraction of shares owned by the third largest shareholder.
Fraction of shares owned by the fourth largest shareholder.
Fraction of shares owned by the fifth largest shareholder.
Fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholders
together.
Fraction of shares owned by the executive directors.
Dummy variable that equals one if the controlling
shareholder has more than 50% of the shares.
Dummy variable that equals one if there is another owner
with at least 10% of the shares, and zero otherwise.
Dummy variable that equals one if the largest controlling
ultimate shareholder is a financial institution.
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Firm Age
Board size
Growth
Liquidity ratio
Industrial dummy

The natural log of the number of years that a firm is listed
on an exchange.
Size of the board of directors.
Percentage increase in sales from previous year.
Weight of cash and cash equivalents on total assets.
Dummy variable that equals one for industrial companies.
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25.560

12.576

1.000

54.000

8.714
-4.035
9.549

2.078
32.553
12.878

4.000
-100.000
0.000

13.000
122.096
79.940
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Ownership Concentration, Performance and other Variables: a Preliminary
Analysis:
Analysis found in table 2 shows the mean of variables in companies that top five
stockholders ownership is concentrated and other companies that top five stock holders
ownership is not concentrated.
Table 2: Difference in means across concentrated and non-concentrated companies:
Concentrated
Non-concentrated
companies
companies
P-value diff.
Variable
(Ownership
(Ownership 5sh ≤
5sh > 56.08%)
56.08%)
Ownership Concentration:
Ownership first shareholder (%)
44.778
20.750
0.000
Ownership second shareholder (%)
18.439
8.919
0.000
Ownership third shareholder (%)
8.648
4.180
0.000
Ownership fourth shareholder (%)
3.488
2.249
0.041
Ownership fifth shareholder (%)
0.823
1.039
0.506
Ownership 5sh (%)
76.175
33.424
0.000
Managerial ownership (%)
1.434
9.039
0.000
Corporate performance:
Return on Assets
2.469
5.042
0.066
Simple Tobin's Q
0.955
1.091
0.011
Control variables:
Foreign ownership
40.551
16.245
0.000
Institutional ownership
69.004
30.242
0.000
Firm size (Millions)
1289740.949
721888.090
0.082
Financial leverage
43.897
39.400
0.287
Firm Age
29.683
20.950
0.000
Board size
8.619
8.650
0.914
Growth
-0.046
-0.041
0.923
Liquidity ratio
8.250
11.401
0.175

In table 2 it can be noticed that companies with low ownership concentration had better
performance indicators (ROA & T’Q). The difference was statistically significant at 10%
using ROA and at 5% using T’Q. Companies with high ownership concentration had
lower performance indicators. It was noticed also that companies with high ownership
concentration had higher foreign and institutional ownership. The difference was
statistically significant at 1%. Companies with higher ownership concentration were
companies with larger size, higher age, higher leverage and with less liquidity and
growth.
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Models and Empirical Study:
Like most empirical corporate finance research, the analysis of the relationship between
ownership dimensions and firm performance faces the challenge of endogeneity, which
can arise from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality. In the
context of the ownership–performance relationship, the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity arises when one or more latent variables drive the observed relationship
between ownership dimensions and firm performance.
To check the validity of the study models and data, several tests were performed like,
normal distribution test, time series stationarity test, autocorrelation and multicolinearity
and models were checked for not having homoscedasticity. Errors were corrected and
results are believed to be accurate.
This study tries to find the effect of ownership dimensions on company
performance. Thus, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and institutional
ownership are considered as independent variables and company performance is
considered as the dependent variable. The study also uses two different measurement
tools to measure the dependent variable (company performance). The first one is simple
Tobin’s Q formula and the second one is Return on Assets (ROA) formula. The estimated
equations are as follows:
n 9

Performanceit     1OwnerConce it   2 ManagOwnerit   3 InstitOwne rit   Control it   it
k 1

The study hypotheses aim at investigating the effect of ownership concentration,
managerial ownership and institutional ownership on performance. Company
performance was measured by two indicators, Tobin’s Q and ROA. Three main
independent variables were inserted to represent the study hypotheses (Ownership firstfifth shareholder (%), Ownership 5sh (%), Concentrated ownership dummy, Multiple
Blockholders dummy, and Financial ownership dummy), managerial ownership and
institutional ownership. Many control variables were added to the model, and they were:
managerial ownership, company size, company age, financial leverage, board size,
growth, liquidity, sector and year.
To reach precise results about the relation between ownership structure and performance.
The study used Two-Stage Least Squares 2SLS to overcome endogeneity. Results are
shown in table 3.
Testing the first hypothesis: the relation between ownership concentration and
company performance:
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and
company performance.
Morck et al., (1988), claimed that diffuseness of ownership would weaken the monitoring
power on management or it may be an advantage to the management by not letting any
block shareholders control the firm in their favor against minority shareholders. The
concentrated ownership creates a majority shareholders and minority shareholders with
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Khamis, Hamdan & Elali | Ownership Structure Dimensions and Corporate Performance

diverging interests and objectives. In a market environment where laws protecting
minority shareholders are absent or weak, a situation of majority shareholders controlling
the company will be created and the performance of the company would be affected
negatively.
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares 2SLS Results:
ROA Model
Tobin's Q Model
Variable
tptΒ
β
Statistic
value
Statistic
Constant
19.609
2.520
2.448
4.737
0.034
Ownership Concentration:
Ownership first shareholder (%)
-0.172
-2.156
0.034
-0.016
-3.097
Ownership second shareholder
(%)
0.553
2.450
0.017
-0.013
-0.872
Ownership third shareholder (%)
-0.265
-1.269
0.209
-0.011
-0.820
Ownership fourth shareholder (%)
0.410
1.740
0.086
0.007
0.464
Ownership fifth shareholder (%)
-0.175
-0.567
0.573
-0.048
-2.334
Ownership 5sh (%)
-0.189
-2.002
0.048
-0.012
-0.782
Concentrated ownership dummy
-3.181
-0.834
0.407
0.042
0.166
Multiple blockholders dummy
-2.542
-1.042
0.301
0.022
0.135
Financial ownership dummy
0.355
0.217
0.829
-0.050
-0.459
Managerial ownership (%)
0.096
1.640
0.105
0.004
1.161
Institutional ownership
0.108
1.982
0.051
0.010
2.792
Control variables:
Foreign ownership
-0.224
-4.000
0.000
-0.012
-3.159
Firm size (Millions)
0.000
1.772
0.081
0.000
1.474
Financial leverage
-8.308
-2.300
0.024
0.329
1.372
Firm Age
0.016
0.225
0.822
-0.001
-0.185
Board size
-1.402
-1.707
0.092
-0.153
-2.812
Growth
3.887
1.566
0.122
0.002
0.011
Liquidity ratio
-0.086
-1.457
0.150
-0.002
-0.396
R Square
0.543
0.489
Adjusted R Square
0.434
0.367
F-Statistic
4.972
3.998
p-value (F-Statistic)
0.000
0.000
t-Critical: at df 209, and confidence level of 99% is 2.326 and level of 95% is 1.960and
level of 90% is 1.645.
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 210-10-1 = 199) and (df for numerator =β =11 and
confidence level of 99% is 2.34 and confidence level of 95% is 1.84 and confidence level
of 10% is 1.6.
Significance at: *10%; **5% and ***1% levels.
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pvalue
0.000
0.003
0.386
0.415
0.644
0.022
0.771
0.868
0.893
0.648
0.250
0.007
0.002
0.145
0.174
0.854
0.006
0.991
0.694
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Many ownership concentration indicators were used in this study. It can be seen from
table 3 that the percentage of ownership for the first stockholder has a negative effect on
performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q. The percentage of
ownership for the second, third, fourth and fifth owners did not have an effect on
performance with statistical significance, excluding ownership of the second largest
owner relation with ROA and relation between fifth largest owner with T’Q. Ownership
5sh (%) which summarizes the top five ownerships and its relation with performance, had
a negative relation with performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q.
Based on that, the first hypothesis may be accepted as it was shown that there is a
statistical significant negative relation between ownership concentration and company
performance. This result is consistent with (Abuserdaneh, Zureikat & Al- Sheikh, 2010)
where they found a negative and statistically significant relation between ownership
concentration and performance in the Jordanian market. When ownership of a company
is concentrated, this creates a group of controlling shareholders that would protect their
interests rather than the interests of the company itself or minority shareholders affecting
negatively on the performance of the company.
Testing the second hypothesis: The relation between managerial ownership and
company performance:
This dimension is related to the agency theory, as it suggests that management should be
owning shares in the company to prevent it from working for its own interests. However,
when management owns a large proportion of the company, it is also expected to work
for its own favor.
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and company
performance.
The relation between managerial ownership and performance was positive but not
statistically significant. Thus, the second hypothesis may be rejected. This can be
justified by the minimal proportion of managerial ownership that exists in Bahraini
market. The results may not reflect the actual situation. It is also consistent with what was
found by researchers like (Severin, 2001; Kumar, 2003).
Testing the third hypothesis: The relation between institutional ownership and
performance :
Fama, (1980), indicated in his study that institutional ownership improves firm
performance, many studies like (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) found that institutional
ownership would affect performance in two ways: the first one that it makes outside
block shareholders overcome the controlling managers and the second one is: that it
would reduce the free rider problem which arise from the lack of shareholders control.
Institutional ownership is the most common form of ownership structure in Bahrain
Bourse (Khamis et al., 2015).
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H3: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and company
performance.
2SLS analysis in table (3) shows that there is a positive relationship between institutional
ownership and performance using ROA at 5% and T’Q at less than 1%. This result is
consistent with what was found in some studies like (Wan, 1990) (Khamis et al., 2015)
and partially with what was found by others like (Berger, 2003; Sarac, 2002).
Further Results:
The results of testing the study models shown in table 3 reveals a negative relationship
with statistical significance between foreign ownership and performance in Bahraini
companies. Although researchers assume that foreign investors may enhance the
performance of a company, as they bring experience and technology. However, this
assumption was not proven in Bahraini market, as foreign ownership had a negative
effect on performance. The distance and reduced amount of information may weaken the
ability of foreign investors to improve performance of Bahraini companies. This is
consistent with other studies that found the same relation like (Solung & Nor, 2008).
Company size had a positive relation with performance but was not statistically
significant. The results regarding the effect of financial leverage on performance were
conflicting. It had a negative effect on performance using ROA and a positive effect
using T’Q but it was not statistically significant. Company age did not have any effect
with statistical significance on performance using ROA and T’Q. Board size had a
negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less than 1% using
T’Q company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical significance on
performance in Bahraini companies.
The effect of managerial ownership on the relation between ownership
concentration and company performance:
A question may be raised about the role of managerial ownership in performance when
ownership is concentrated and on which level of concentration; managerial ownership
could have a positive effect on performance? The study analyzed the relation between
concentration, performance and managerial ownership. Results of 2SLS for this relation
are shown in table (4). Managerial ownership does not have positive effect on
performance except in the situation when ownership concentration declines as on the
fourth ownership concentration. This is consistent with what was found by (Perreni et al.,
2008) when they found that managerial ownership is beneficial only in non-concentrated
firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position in the firm to extract
private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders by appointing managers that
represent its own interest. These results contrasted what was found in the study of
(Khamis et al., 2015) where managerial ownership was found to have a negative effect
with statistical significance on performance when using T’Q however it found the same
result of having positive effect without statistical significance on performance when
using ROA. This difference may be explained by the use of different statistical
techniques which is 2SLS in this study to reduce the endogeneity effect in this relation,
while in the previous study used OLS. 2SLS is considered to be more accurate and
reflecting actual relation between the variables of this study.
50

AABFJ | Volume 9, no. 4, 2015

Table 4: The effect of managerial ownership on the relation between ownership
concentration and performance:
ROA Model
Tobin's Q Model
Variable
t-Statistic
t-Statistic
β
β
(p-value)
(p-value)
Constant
0.230
3.982***
0.122
4.032***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Managerial ownership*first
-0.007
-1.157
0.013
0.336
shareholder
(0.249)
(0.737)
Managerial ownership*second
0.051
1.569
0.008
0.036
shareholder
(0.119)
(0.971)
Managerial ownership*third
-0.155
-2.921***
-0.022
-5.761***
shareholder
(0.004)
(0.000)
Managerial ownership*fourth
0.223
2.205**
0.057
7.595***
shareholder
(0.029)
(0.000)
Managerial ownership*fifth
0.092
1.402
0.034
1.466***
shareholder
(0.163)
(0.174)
Control variables:
Foreign ownership
0.004
0.131
-0.004
-2.510**
(0.896)
(0.014)
Firm size (Millions)
0.002
1.841*
0.003
1.161
(0.068)
(0.249)
Financial leverage
-17.493
-7.288***
-0.304
-1.092
(0.000)
(0.278)
Firm Age
0.139
2.453**
0.008
2.516**
(0.015)
(0.014)
Board size
0.710
1.686*
0.073
1.844*
(0.094)
(0.069)
Growth
11.130
5.778***
0.045
0.334
(0.000)
(0.739)
Liquidity ratio
-0.075
-1.504
0.001
0.431
(0.136)
(0.668)
R Square
0.455
0.576
Adjusted R Square
0.412
0.515
F-Statistic
10.629
9.503
p-value (F-Statistic)
0.000
0.000
t-Critical: at df 209, and confidence level of 99% is 2.326 and level of 95% is 1.960and level of 90% is
1.645.
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 210-10-1 = 199) and (df for numerator =β =11 and confidence level
of 99% is 2.34 and confidence level of 95% is 1.84 and confidence level of 10% is 1.6.
Significance at: *10%; **5% and ***1% levels.
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Board size had a negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less
than 1% using T’Q company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical
significance on performance in Bahraini companies.
Conclusion, Study Limitations and Recommendation:
The main objective of this study was investigating the relation between ownership
structure and company performance in the Bahraini market. The study investigated the
relation between ownership concentration, taking into consideration several dimensions
of concentration to analyze the relation intensively on different levels. It also studied the
effect of institutional and managerial ownership on company performance. Ownership
concentration and managerial ownership are part of agency theory and they are important
aspects of corporate governance. Institutional ownership was studied because it was
found to be the most common type of ownership that exists in Bahraini market (Khamis
et al., 2015). The study found many results regarding the relation between its variables
and their effect on company performance.
Ownership concentration was studied using different dimensions; the percentage of
ownership for the first stockholder had a negative effect on performance with statistical
significance using ROA and T’Q. The percentage of ownership for the second, third,
fourth and fifth owners did not have an effect on performance with statistical
significance, excluding ownership of the second largest owner relation with ROA and
relation between fifth largest owner with T’Q Ownership 5sh (%) which summarizes the
top five ownerships and its relation with performance, had a negative relation with
performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q.
The relation between managerial ownership and performance was positive but not
statistically significant. The study also analyzed the relation between concentration,
performance and managerial ownership. Managerial ownership does not have positive
effect on performance except in the situation when ownership concentration declines as
on the fourth ownership concentration. This is consistent with what was found by
(Perreni et al., 2008) when they found that managerial ownership is beneficial only in
non-concentrated firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position in
the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders by appointing
managers that represent its own interest.
The study found that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and
performance using ROA at 5% and T’Q at less than 1%. A negative relationship with
statistical significance between foreign ownership and performance in Bahraini
companies was also found. Company size had a positive relation with performance but
not statistically significant. The results regarding the effect of financial leverage on
performance were conflicting. It had a negative effect on performance using ROA and a
positive effect using T’Q but it was not statistically significant. Company age did not
have any effect with statistical significance on performance using ROA and T’Q. Board
size had a negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less than
1% using T’Q. Company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical
significance on performance in Bahraini companies.
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The study is considered to be limited because it studies performance in companies in a
period of five years only (2007-2011). This time series may be unstable because the
global financial crisis occurred during this period. Future studies may take longer and
different time series. The study was conducted in the Bahraini market and it is considered
to be a small sample to be studied in an emerging market. Further studies may be
conducted on the whole GCC market, because the GCC economies are considered to
have a lot of similarities in lows and the nature of the economies. The study encourages
officials to reveal data concerning family ownership. This factor was not studied because
data regarding it is not available. However, family ownership exists in the Bahraini
market. The most important output of this study was the recommendation for officials to
improve the Bahraini market laws to enhance corporate governance to a level that all
shareholders would be protected under these laws regardless being from minority or
majority shareholders.
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